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A number of behaviours influence health in a non-monotonic way. Physical activity and alcohol consumption,
for instance, may be beneficial to one’s health in moderate but detrimental in large quantities. We
develop a demand-for-health framework that incorporates the feature of a physiologically optimal
level. An individual may still choose a physiologically non-optimal level, because of the trade-off
in his or her preferences for health versus other utility-affecting commodities. However, any deviation
from the physiologically optimal level will be punished with respect to health. A set of steady-state
comparative statics is derived regarding the effects on the demand for health and health-related behaviour,
indicating that individuals react differently to exogenous changes, depending on the amount of the
health-related behaviour they demand. We also show (a) that a steady-state equilibrium is a saddle-point
and (b) that the physiologically optimal level may be a steady-state equilibrium for the individual.
Our analysis suggests that general public-health policies may, to some extent, be counterproductive

















Most human behaviours are related to health. Individual health affects consumption patterns, but 
consumption patterns also affect individual health. While the sole intention of health-care 
utilisation is either to improve current health, whenever it has fallen below a certain illness-
defining threshold value, or to prevent future illness, rather than to consume it for the sake of its 
direct utility (which might even be negative), the intention of many other behaviours may be 
twofold: both to gain direct consumption utility and to improve health (or to decrease the risk of 
illness). The latter category includes, for instance, physical exercise, certain consumption and 
composition of food, alcohol consumption and, as a matter of fact, any recreational activity (art, 
literature, music, etc). Obviously, health effects may be more or less intentional, and certain 
consumption patterns may also be detrimental to your health. Smoking is an unambiguous 
example of the latter. 
 
Smoking is always bad for your health – and increasingly so with increased consumption (Doll et 
al, 1976; Doll et al, 1994; Colditz, 2000; Vineis et al, 2004). In contrast, there appears to be a 
physiologically determined, individually optimal level of activity (greater than zero) as regards, for 
instance, physical exercise, food intake, alcohol consumption, and sleep, implying that activity 
levels below or above that level would reduce the positive health effects of the activity. A 
consistently positive association between physical-activity level and health-related quality of life 
has been found (Bize et al, 2007). Certainly, too small amounts of physical exercise means that 
the human body atrophies and that the risks of several diseases, including coronary heart disease, 
hypertension, stroke, diabetes, depression, osteoporosis, and cancers of the breast and colon, 
increase (Garrett et al, 2004). However, too much or too intensive physical exercise means that 
the human body will wear down and/or that the risk of injury increases (Tisi and Shearman, 
1998; Locke, 1999; Ji, 2001; Randolph, 2007; Howatson G and van Someren, 2008; Morton et al, 
2009). A varied and balanced diet is emphasised in guidelines on healthy eating; see, for instance   3
(Swedish National Food Agency, 2012).  Too little food or too one-sided diet lead to health 
problems (Steinhausen, 2002). Too much also creates health problems (Steinhausen and Weber, 
2009), in particular in combination with too little physical exercise. Overweight (25 ≤ BMI < 30)
1 
and obesity (BMI ≥ 30) increase the risks of asthma, coronary heart disease, hypertension, 
diabetes, osteoarthritis, and cancer, including cancers of the breast and colon (Colditz, 1999; 
Must et al., 1999); Dal Grande, 2009). Also underweight (BMI < 18.5) has been shown to be 
associated with health problems; for instance, coronary heart disease, diabetes, and gallbladder 
disease (Must et al., 1999). Light to moderate drinkers are at lower risk of coronary heart disease, 
stroke, diabetes, and gallstone disease than non-drinkers, while an increasing intake increases the 
risks of dementia, liver cirrhosis, pancreatitis, osteoporosis, and most cancers, including cancer of 
the oesophagus, breast, pancreas, colon, and rectum (Grönbaeck, 2009). Finally, both short and 
long sleep durations appear to be related to increased likelihood of obesity, diabetes, 
hypertension, and cardiovascular disease (Buxton and Marcelli, 2010; Sabanayagam and Shankar, 
2010). It should be emphasised, though, that which level of physical exercise, food intake, alcohol 
consumption, and sleep is physiologically optimal differs among individuals, and if you have 
good genes and/or are lucky, you may suffer less from “unhealthy” behaviour than less 
advantaged people. 
 
In general terms, these associations have been known for decades. Yet, there are no clear 
temporal trends worldwide towards healthier life-styles (Knuth and Hallai, 2009), and the 
population variance of these behaviours is large; for instance, many people do not perform any, 
or very little, physical exercise, others perform very large amounts. We will demonstrate that such 
polarization may be possible to explain, within a modified version of Grossman’s demand-for-
health model, assuming that there is a (strictly positive) physiologically optimal level of the 
corresponding health behaviour.     
                                                            
1 BMI (body mass index) is calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters.   4
 
The demand-for-health model extended the human capital theory by explicitly incorporating 
health and recognising that there are both consumption and investment motives for investing in 
health (Grossman, 1972a, b). It resulted in an economic theory of individual health-related 
behaviour.  The basic features of the model are (1) that the individual demands health (a) for its 
utility enhancing effects (the consumption motive), and (b) for its effect on the amount of 
healthy time (the investments motive), (2) that the demand for investments in health is derived 
from the more fundamental demand for health, (3) that the investments in health are produced 
by the individual, and (4) that the stock of health depreciates at each point in time. The 
production aspect implies that the produced amount of investments in health has to be 
assimilated by the individual. Thus, the effects of, for instance, physical exercise, is assimilated 
and transformed into health by the individual at rates that differ between individuals. This goes 
beyond the effect of the depreciation of the stock of health at each point in time. 
 
Although  some variance in health-related behaviours may be readily understood within 
Grossman’s original version of the demand-for-health model, the observed variance seems to be 
greater than what would be expected, solely taken the variability in physiologically determined, 
individually optimal level of activity into account. Furthermore, the observation that some health-
related behaviours seem to be heavily distributed around two activity levels – high and low – 
cannot be explained within the original version of the model, except as a consequence of a 
corresponding distribution of behavioural-determining individual traits, which, in most cases, 
seems implausible. In this paper we develop a version of Grossman’s demand-for-health model, 
modified in order to focus on individually optimal choices of health-related behaviour, 
distinguished by physiologically optimal activity levels.  
   5
Since its introduction, the demand-for-health model has been extended in various ways; 
incorporating uncertainty (Dardanoni and Wagstaff, 1987, 1990; Selden, 1993; Chang, 1996; 
Liljas, 1998, 2000), the family as producer of health (Jacobson, 2000; Bolin et al., 2001, 2002b), 
the employer as producer of health (Bolin et al., 2002c), social capital (Bolin et al., 2003), and 
healthy and unhealthy consumption (Forster, 2001). To our knowledge, however, the effect on 
the demand for health and health investments of the double-facetted nature of individual 
behaviours with physiologically determined optimal levels as regards health and negative or 
positive health effects, depending on the level of activity, has never been analysed.
2 While the 
emphasis of the paper is on extending theory, it is shown that such an analysis has important 
implications for the understanding of individual health-related behaviour and, hence, for 
designing and evaluating various health policies. 
 
 The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Next, we will present the model. After that, 
we will derive the optimality conditions. Following this, we will analyse the properties of the 
dynamic system in terms of steady-state and stability conditions. The final section contains a 
discussion and some conclusions.   
 
2. THE MODEL 
General structure  
Our theoretical model takes its departure in the demand-for-health model developed by Michael 
Grossman (1972a, b). It differs from Grossman’s original formulation mainly (1) by avoiding an 
                                                            
2 Forster (2001) studied health-related effects of there being two types of consumption: good for health and bad for 
health. In both cases the effect on health is monotonic in consumption. In our case, the relationship between the 
amount of behaviour and its health effect is not monotonic. Grossman (1972a) examined the importance of joint 
production in the production of gross health investment. He argued that several goods are demanded as inputs into 
the production of commodities, other than health, that yield utility but may have adverse health effects.     6
explicit treatment of the individual’s time allocation problem
3, and (2) by considering health-
related behaviours that are not monotonic in their effect on health. 
 
2.1 Preferences  
We consider a version of the demand-for-health model, in continuous time, in which health at 
each point in time,   , is produced by the individual through a specific health behaviour,   , 
which influences health positively below a certain level, and negatively above that level; we 
assume that the smallest amount of the behaviour    is zero. The individual derives utility from 
his or her stock of health,   , from health-related behaviour,   , as well as from consumption 
unrelated to health,   . More specifically, we assume that preferences are additively separable, 
time additive, and concave in all arguments. In order to reduce complexity and, hence, to increase 
the capability of the model to generate unambiguous predictions, we also assume that the 
marginal utility of (the health-unrelated) consumption is constant. Formally, individual 
preferences are represented by the following quasi-linear utility function:
4 
    ,                         ·   , (  
   0 ;     
   0 ;     
   0 ;  ,    ,  )
5 (1) 
where   is the marginal utility of consumption. 
 
The positive health effect produced by the behaviour,   , is partially offset by a natural 
depreciation – at rate       0   1    – of the existing stock of health capital.
6 For tractability of 
                                                            
3 Instead, we utilise the individual’s cost function pertaining to the allocation problem that he or she faces. This 
means that we – implicitly – assume that the individual has solved the time allocation problem.  
4 Quasi-linear utility functions have been extensively applied in economic analyses of the family, and related issues; 
see, for instance, Chang (2009, 2007); Chang and Weisman (2005); Konrad et al., (2002); Konrad and Lommerud 
(2000). Essentially, the quasi-linearity assumption means that the analysis is focused on the importance of relative 
prices, since there is no income effect for goods other than the linear-utility good.   
5 Throughout the paper, a subscript indicates a partial derivative (except when t indicates time dependence). 
Following established practice, the time derivative is denoted using a dot above the function or variable.
  
6 Fundamentally, one may argue that the health-related behaviour is an input into the production of gross health 
investments and not the output of that production process. In an analysis of the composition of inputs into the 
production of gross health investments this distinction would be necessary. Here, however, our focus is on the 
effects of a specific behaviour having negatively U-shaped effect on health.      7
dynamic analysis we consider a model in which the rate of depreciation is time independent.
7 
Further, we distinguish between the ability to produce (see below) the behaviour,   , and the rate 
at which the behaviour is transformed into gross health investments,   . Thus, the equation of 
motion for the stock of health capital is:  
           ·             ·           ·   , (2) 
where    is the physiologically optimal amount of the behaviour (    0 ). Any deviation from 
the physiologically optimal level will reduce the positive impact or produce a negative 
contribution to health; the parameter   captures the rate at which this negative contribution is 
dependent on the deviation from optimal behaviour (  1   .
8 Thus, a given level of the 
behaviour has both a direct effect on health and an indirect effect that results from deviating 
from the physiologically optimal level. Therefore, the maximum influence on health is   
     
 
 ·      ,  achieved when     
 
 ·      , since a small increase in    from   produces a smaller 
negative contribution to health than the positive marginal direct effect. The adverse health effect 
is bound below at     0 , in which case the gross health investment is – ·     .        
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Figure 1 illustrates the influence on gross health investment produced by each feasible amount of 
the behaviour. It facilitates our analysis to distinguish between two individual types: those that 
exert behaviour to the left and those to the right of 
 
 ·      . Notice, that a higher rate of 
punishment (higher  ) means that the marginal effect of each    on gross health investments for 
                                                            
7 In this paper, we analyse time-paths and stability of equilibrium. This is considerably less difficult in autonomous 
systems, which require a time-independent rate of depreciation, or that total depreciation at each point in time is 
independent of the health stock. This is in contrast to Grossman (1972), Muurinen (1982), Wagstaff (1986), Liljas 
(1998), Jacobson (2000), and Bolin et al. (2001a), who all examined models with time-dependent rates of 
depreciation. 
8 This assumption is made for analytical convenience – it means that the steady-state loci can be constructed more 
decisively, without having to take into account behaviour when   is close to zero.   8
the first type decreases, when        , and increases when        ; while, for the latter, it 
always increases.   
  
2.2 Production technology and cost function 
For simplicity, we assume that the technology used for producing the behaviour is homogenous 
and exhibits constant returns to scale. Thus, the technology is formally represented by a 
production function that is homogenous, of degree 1 in the quantity of investment. Thus, the 
dual cost-of-behaviour function is homogenous of degree 1 with respect to the quantity of the 
behaviour, i.e., the cost of producing the behaviour is constant with respect to its quantity. 
Formally, the cost function is: 
              , ;  ·   ,      (3) 
where     , ;   is the one-unit cost of producing the behaviour,    is the composite price of 
market goods and services used in the production,   is the wage rate, and E is the level of 
knowledge. Thus, differences between individuals regarding their production efficiencies are 
comprised in   and  .  
 
2.3 Constraints 
For dynamic analysis tractability, we assume that there are no financial markets and, hence, that 
total spending at time   equals market income at time  .
9 Hence, with full income denoted   and 
the constant price of consumption  , the individual’s budget constraint is: 
 ·              ·   .   (4) 
                                                            
9 In this way an autonomous dynamic model is obtained without introducing time as yet another state variable. 
Analysing properties of non-autonomous dynamic system is beyond what can be achieved using most economists’ 
tool box. Autonomous systems are considerably more straightforward while allowing for important issues to be 
analysed. Dynamic models of health behaviour when there are no financial markets have been used by, for instance, 
Liljas (1998) and Forster (2001). Here, the absence of capital markets means that the only way that the individual can 
transfer resources between different points in time is by investing in health capital. We have made the assumption 
that preferences, prices, technology and the rate of depreciation are time invariant, which means that individual 
incentives for transferring resources between stages of the lifecycle do not comprise any timing-of-investment 
considerations. With time-varying prices for the inputs into production of health capital, this would be a major 
purpose for transferring resources in time.         9
We express full market income as a function of health. Time is allocated between three uses: sick 
time,   
 , time allocated to the production of health-related behaviour, and time allocated to the 
market. At each point in time the individual chooses   , which completely determines    – via 
the health-capital equation of motion – and    as the difference between full income and cost of 
the health-related behaviour. Sick time is a function of health capital,        and, hence, full 
market income is: 
        ·  Ω   τ      ,    (5) 
where    denotes total time. Time available for market work increases as the stock of health 
capital increases. This is manifested through the amount of time spent at being sick being 
inversely related to the stock of health capital, i.e.,   
   0 . We assume that the productivity of 
health in producing healthy time is diminishing, i.e.,    
   0 .  Thus, potential income is 
increasing and concave in health capital, since        ·   
   0 ; and         ·    
   0 . 
 
2.4 The individual’s control problem 
The intertemporal problem that faces the individual is to choose the time path of health capital in 
order to maximise his or her lifetime utility. We assume a fix end point for the individual’s 









subject to:                 ·             ·   . 
                                                            
10 For convenience, we formulate the individual’s optimisation problem as a vertical terminal line problem, which 
means that the terminal time is fixed, but the terminal state is free (Chiang, 1992, p.182). This is to be distinguished 
from a horizontal terminal line problem in which the terminal time, T, is free, and, hence, that the terminal state is 
restricted to          . The optimality conditions resulting from these two problems only differ regarding the 
transversality conditions. In the horizontal terminal line problem, optimal length of life is, implicitly, determined by 
the transversality conditions; see, for instance, Ehrlich and Chuma (1990). The individual’s life-time optimisation 
problem was formulated as a vertical time line problem by, for instance, Bolin et al (2001; 2002b, c).   10
Transversality conditions are:   
     ·              0 ;             0 , where      is the 
smallest permissible level of health.  
 
 3 RESULTS 
3.1 Conditions for optimal paths of behaviour and health 
The solution to the maximisation problem is achieved by applying optimal control theory. The 
maximum principle gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal control of   , given 
the time path of the state variable   . The current-value Hamilton function for the maximisation 
problem is: 
       ,   ,         
  ·        ·             ·     (6) 
The maximum principle yields the following equations of motion.
11 First, for the stock of health:  
  
 
    
  
   
      
    ·
 
  ·   
          ·   
          (7) 
For the optimal choice of the single control variable,    (consumption expenses equal the 
residual between income and health-behaviour expenses), the first-order condition is: 
 
  
   
    
    ·
 
      
  ·  1 2·             0 . (8) 
Interpretation  
Let us begin by stating an immediate consequence: First, notice that since   
   0 , we know that 
  
   0          0,  .
12 The implication of this – in our model – is that whether or not the 
amount of health-related behaviour that the individual chooses is below 
 
 ·       is determined 
by equation (8): if 
  
 
   
 
  (if the marginal rate of substitution between health behaviour and 
health-unrelated consumption is larger than the ratio between marginal costs) the individual will 
choose a    above 
 
 ·       (and vice versa).   
                                                            
11 The Hamiltonian function,  , is jointly and strictly concave in   ,  . First, notice that            0 . That 
leaves only the diagonal terms of the Hessian matrix. These are:          
   0 , and          
      
  · ·     
0, which means that | | > 0 and, hence, that the Hamiltonian is jointly and strictly concave in   ,  . 
12 See Caputo (2005), p 56.   11
 
After rearranging equation (7), the stock-of-health equilibrium condition reads: 
   
    ·
 
  ·   
         
   
 
  
  ·   
 . (7’) 
This condition requires that the current value of health capital (left-hand side), equals the 
instantaneous user cost of health capital (right-hand side). In order to derive an expression for 
optimal health-related behaviour, notice that the costate variable,   
 , gives the value of health 
capital, which is independent of the health-related behaviour,   . 
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From rearranging equation (8) we obtain: 
       
   
 ·
 
     
 
    ·         .   (8’) 
The right-hand side represents the net-marginal cost of the health-related behaviour   . In Figure 
2, the value of health capital is drawn against health-behaviour, where the curves represent the 




The intersections between the straight value-of-health-capital lines and the marginal-cost-of-
health-investment schedule depict individually perceived optimal health-related behaviour. Since 
deviating positively or negatively, by equal amounts, from the physiologically optimal level results 
in equal amounts of health depreciation, there are two possible equilibria, symmetrically around 
the vertical line at 
 
 ·      . Individual preferences for the behaviour,   , determine at which side 
of the line the optimum is situated.    
                                                            
13 It is straight-forward to check that the net marginal cost of health capital (MCH) curve, given by the right-hand 
side of (8’), is positively (negatively) inclined to the left (right) of     
 
 ·      , and that the slope is always 
increasing (       0   .  
     12
 
3.2 Steady states, dynamics and stability  
In this section we will focus on the equilibrium properties. We begin by a description of possible 
steady states, defined as     0  and     0 , followed by steady-state comparative statics. Then we 




The equation of motion of the stock of health is given by (2). Let:   
             ·             ·            ,    .   (9) 
In order to obtain the corresponding equation of motion for   , take the total time-derivatives of 
(8), which yields: 
  
    ·  1 2· ·              
  ·2·      
    ·       0.   (10) 
Solving for       yields: 
      
 ·    · ·        
   
 · ·     
          ,    ,   (11) 
where       
          
      
   
  ·   
          ·   
 . 
 
The dynamics of the system is described by equations (9) and (10), and the steady state loci can 
be found, using     ,      0  and     ,      0 . Let us begin with the     0  locus. 
Rearranging the equation     ,      0  yields: 
    
   ·  · 
 · ·   
 
  ·       
          
    . (12) 
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14 Notice that with a steady-state concept that allows constant change in health or behaviour, we would obtain the 
same results.     13
Figure 3 illustrates the principal shapes of the steady-state loci. The graphs drawn in the figure are 
obtained as follows: equation (12) is a parabola having an inflexion point (      
   ·  · 
 · ·    at 
    
 
       , and intersections with the B-axis at     
 
           
      
     . Notice that if 
steady-state behaviour is        , equation (12) implies that the steady-state health stock is 
    
  
  . In the appendix, we show that the     0  locus has one branch at each side of     
 
       , and that it is increasing in the left branch, decreasing in the right, and concave in both. 
From equation (11) it is clear that a third     0  locus is     
 




Steady-state comparative statics with respect to the four different variables  ,  ,  , and    can 
be derived, using the following equation system:16  
    ,      0   
     ,       ·  1 2· ·           0   
 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The comparative statics pertaining to    and    are derived in the appendix. Qualitative results 
are reported in Table 1. The table is partitioned into four subsections – one for the type of 
individual who exerts     
 
 ·      
  (type 1); two for the two types who exert less than 
 
 ·      
  
of their health-related behaviour (types 2 and 3), and one for the type of individual who exerts 
    
 
 ·      
  (type 4). As regards the results for the type 1 individual, remember that the 
                                                            
15 We do not consider the dynamics of the system in this section. Thus, we are not concerned with whether or not a 
small change in a parameter will result in a move from an initial steady state to a new one. Instead, we ask what 
steady-state values would have resulted, had a parameter been different.  
16    is the numerator of equation (11).   14
inflexion-point value of health capital, at the     0  locus, is       
   ·  · 
 · ·  , which means that 
the amount of health capital is negatively related to the rate of depreciation (as expected).  
 
The steady-state effects of changes in   
An increase in the rate at which deviating from the physiologically optimal health-related 
behaviour is “punished” will have a negative impact on the demand for health for all types of 
individuals. However, this does not translate directly into health behaviour. The term   
  ·  1 
2·            reflects the value of one unit of health behaviour. Now, for the type 2 individual 
(    
 
 ·    ) the change in this value, when the stock of health decreases, which increases the 
shadow price of health capital, and the rate at which deviating from   is punished increases, is 
ambiguous. This is so since the marginal effect on health which results from an additional unit of 
  decreases, making the total effect on   
  ·  1 2·             ambiguous, since   
  
        
 
 ·      
 . For the type 3 individual,        , these forces work in the same 
direction, inducing an increase in the amount of  . For the fourth type, however, the value of 
one additional unit of the behaviour   decreases. 
 
The steady-state effects of changes in   
The effect on demand for health is negative for all types considered. The effect on health 
behaviour is ambiguous, however. This is so, since independently of whether    is smaller or 
larger than 
 
 ·     the reduction in demand for health and the effect of an increase in the rate of 
health capital depreciation, which decreases the supply of health capital, work in opposite 
directions.  
 
The steady-state effects of changes in knowledge   15
The demand for health increases for types 2, 3 and 4, assuming that knowledge makes the 
individual a more efficient producer of the health-behaviour (and that the effect of the cost of 
own time is not dominating this efficiency effect). The increase in demand for health is met, 
however, differently by, on the one hand, types 2 and 3, and type 4 on the other: type 4 behaves 
    
 
 ·     and will decrease his or her behaviour, while the other type will increase it. The 
reason for this is that type 2 and 3 have a positive effect on gross health investment of increasing 
the behaviour,  , while type 4 has to reduce the behaviour in order to increase gross health 
investments.  
 
The steady-state effects of changes in price    
Increasing the price of the market good used for producing the health behavior leads to a 
reduction in the amount of health demanded, for type 2 and 3 individuals; while the demand for 
health increases for type 4 individuals. Thus, although the demand for the behavior,   , decreases 
for all types, this is beneficial for health for type 4 individuals only.  
 
3.3 Stability and dynamics 
In the previous section we examined how a steady state would change in response to a different 
value of an exogenous parameter. In this section we will ask: will the level of health and the 
health-related behavior ever reach an equilibrium? Moreover, what will happen, if an equilibrium 
is slightly disturbed – will the individual return to a steady state? These questions can be answered 
by examining the properties of the Jacobian matrix, i.e., the matrix of first-order derivatives of 
equations (10) and (11):     
     
     
 .
17 We begin, below, by answering the latter question. 
 
Stability of steady state 
                                                            
17 This is achievable even though our dynamic system is not linear; see, for instance, Caputo (2005), p354.
    16
In the appendix it is shown that a steady state for which     
 
 ·      
   is always a saddle point. 
This means that a small disturbance has a high probability of forcing the individual away from the 
steady state. More precisely, there is exactly one stable path (for each equilibrium) that leads to 
that particular steady-state equilibrium. All other paths lead away from it.  
However, a steady state for which     
 
 ·      




The dynamics of the model is expressed in equations     ,     and     ,    . Taking the 
derivative of   and  , with respect to  , leaving out the arguments, results in         ,  and 
        ·
    · ·       
   
 · ·     
          0 when          
 
 ·      
 . This means that       0   below the 
      0  locus, and       0 , above it; and, further, that             0  below the       0  locus when 
         
 
 ·      . Figure 4 illustrates the dynamic behaviour of the individual.  
 




Time paths in the two regions at each side of the vertical       0  locus, bounded by the vertical 
locus, the non-vertical       0  loci and the       0  locus, will move closer to the sink 
equilibrium. This is so, since no integral curve can cross the non-vertical       0  loci. Moreover, 
any initial position above the non-vertical       0  loci but between the vertical locus and the 
stable-branch integral curves towards the saddle-point equilibrium, will move closer to the sink 
equilibrium. That is, for initial points sufficiently close to 
 
 ·      , the movement will be towards 
the stable sink equilibrium.  
   17
For a point initially in one of the two regions bounded by the horizontal axis and the non-vertical 
      0  loci and the       0  locus, there are several possible time-paths. Health and behaviour 
may move towards the corresponding saddle-point equilibrium, or passing into one of the 
regions discussed above and, then, towards the stable equilibrium. It is also possible that health 
and behaviour will move towards the regions to the far left and right, respectively, in which case 
health will continue to deteriorate and health behaviour will continue to increase or decrease (no 
integral curve can cross the       0  locus moving into either of the regions discussed, so, there is 
no return to a healthy trajectory).      
 
4. DISCUSSION 
By introducing – into the theoretical framework of the demand-for-health model – a non-
monotonic influence of health-related behaviour on health as well as punishments with respect to 
health for deviations from the physiologically optimal level of behaviour, we were able to identify 
three types of equilibria, and characterise four types of individuals, using the relation between the 
exerted and the physiologically optimal levels of the health behaviour. For individuals in 
equilibrium – stationary health behaviour and health stock – our model predicts that individual 
health behaviour will be at one of three levels: low (type 3), high (type 4), or medium (type 1 and 
2).  
 
More specifically, the following predictions were derived for the different individual types: the 
type 1 individual exerts the level of health behaviour, which maximizes its influence on health. 
This level is not identical to the physiologically optimal one but slightly higher since a small 
deviation from the physiological optimal level will yield a positive marginal contribution to gross 
health investments. Changes in the rate of punishment, the depreciation rate, education, and 
commodity prices do not affect the health behaviour of the type 1 individual. Increases in the 
rate of punishment and in the depreciation rate will decrease the optimal health level, whereas   18
changes in education or commodity prices will leave the individually perceived optimal health 
level unchanged. The type 2 individual exerts a level of health behaviour, which is strictly below 
the level that maximizes its influence on health but strictly above the physiologically optimal 
level, while the type 3 individual exerts a level, which is below the physiologically optimal level. 
The results of changes in relevant parameters as above are qualitatively similar, except that a 
higher rate of punishment will decrease health behaviour for the type 2 individual and increase it 
for type 3. The type 4 individual prefers a level, which is strictly above the level, which maximizes 
its influence on health. Increases in the rate of punishment, the level of education, and 
commodity prices decreases the optimal levels of the health behaviour. Increases in the rate of 
punishment, the depreciation rate, and the level of education will decrease the optimal level of 
health.   
 
Moreover, the dynamic analyses show that the “low” and “high” equilibria are saddle-point 
stable. This means that an individual, who is initially in one of these equilibria, and who is forced 
into disequilibrium by a small distrurbance, is not likely to return to the initial equilibrium. 
Instead, exerted levels of health behaviour will either diverge further away from equilibrium or 
approach the health-maximization level (type 1) of health behaviour. Notice, the model rules out 
any movement between “low” and “high” equilibria.  
 
Building on the fundaments of the demand-for-health model, we developed a theoretical model 
that incorporates the double facetted nature of much health-related behaviour. Our results can be 
summarized as follows: (1) one important insight produced by the model is that individuals who 
differ regarding their valuation of health-related behaviour, but are otherwise identical, may still 
hold the same amounts of health capital, due to the non-monotonic health effect of the 
behaviour; (2) the non-monotonic effect of the health-related behaviour highlights that changes 
in exogenous parameters potentially affect different individuals not only quantitatively differently   19
but also qualitatively differently. This suggests that public policy efforts that do not take into 
account individual health-related behaviour may be contra productive; and (3) individuals who 
exert the health-related behaviour in a steady-state amount that equals the physiologically optimal 
level plus an amount inversely proportionate to   (the rate at which a deviation in behaviour 
from the physiologically optimal level adversely influence health) are likely to not vary their 
behaviour over time. Further, this suggests that for health behaviours with a high corresponding 
 , this steady state is close to the physiologically optimal level.                  
 
The preceding analysis implies that, in general, health-related public policy has to take into 
account that many behaviours may not be consistently bad or good for one’s health but rather 
that the beneficial or detrimental effects depend on the individually chosen activity level of the 
behaviour in question. Thus, a first-best health policy would distinguish between individuals who 
exert low amounts and individuals who exert high amounts of a specific health-related behaviour. 
An illustrative and, perhaps, provocative, example is alcohol consumption. Given that there is a 
physiologically optimal level (strictly greater than zero) of alcohol consumption, taxing 
individuals that consume above a certain threshold level, and maybe subsidizing those who 
consume below the threshold, would increase population health, ceteris paribus. Obviously, the 
same qualitative conclusion can be made concerning all health-related behaviours that may 
influence health both positively and negatively. Thus, in order to affect such behaviours in a 
health-promoting way, policy-makers would, in principle, have to incorporate not only 
knowledge about the relationship between health and the target behaviour, but also a mechanism 
that is dependent on the type of individual that will be affected.  
 
In practice, a “perfect” discrimination of individuals depending on type of preferences for health-
related behaviours would not be possible due to information problems. Nevertheless, there 
seems to be sufficient information both for taking also undesired health effects into account,   20
when designing and evaluating various health policies. Thus, the lesson for policy-makers of this 
theoretical exercise would be to rely less on general public-health policies and more on tailor-
made measures for specific target groups. 
 
APPENDIX 
We need to establish the value of   and the sign of  ′  partial derivatives. In order to determine 
the value of  , solve for   
  in equation (10), and take the time derivative. We have, first, 
  
   
 · 
    
 
    ·         , and then:   
     
     
  ·  
  
    ·φ· B B    + 
  · 
    
  · · ·  
  
    · ·       
     . For a steady state we have 
  0  (which also follows from equation 14). Moreover,   0  along the     0  locus. 
 
In order to determine the sign of  ′  partial derivatives we use        
      
   
  ·   
   
       ·   
 : 
           
    ·
 
  ·    
   0   
           ·
    
 
    ·           2· ·       ·
 · 
    
 
    ·         
     0. 
      0  (show calculations – immediate from the above) 
Notice, that        0 but     ·  1 2· ·         0 . 
        
 .  
 
The steady state loci 
The     0  loci  
In order to obtain the     0  loci, notice that     ,      0  implies that: 
    ,         
    ·  1 2· ·           0 .      21
First, when  1   2 ·   ·            0 , applying the implicit function theorem on 
     ,     yields:
18  
  
     
  ·    · ·         · · 
  ·    · ·          
  ·    · ·       
  ·    · ·          
  
  
 .    
In order to infer the curvature of the     0  loci in this case, take the implicit derivative of 
  
  , 
which is simply: 
 
   
      
        ·
  
   ·         ·
  
       ·  
  
    
   
  
 0 ,
19    
which means that the   - locus is increasing in the left branch, and decreasing in the right, and 
concave. In the case when  1   2 ·   ·            0  the locus is the vertical line at     
 
 
 ·    .  The shape of the the     0  loci, together with the previously shown shape of the 
    0  locus, establish that there are three separate steady states.  
 
Comparative statics 
For a change in a parameter,  , the effects on steady-state levels of    and    can be obtained 
applying Cramer’s rule to the following system: 
 
     






   
   
    
 .    
     
     
       
  is the Jacobian matrix of equations (9) and (11) evaluated in steady state. 










      




      







The sign of |  | 
|  |   
    1   2 ·   ·         
    ·  1 2· ·            ·  1 2· ·        
  
                                                            
18   0  along the     0  locus.  
19                   0 .   22
Since      0 ;       ·  1 2· ·         0 , the determinant is always negative. 
 
The steady state effects of    
Applying Cramer’s rule to the equations system above gives: 
   
    
        ·         ·    · ·       ·  
|  |  
        ·  ·    · ·           ·    · ·       
 
|  |  
 
        ·  ·    · ·             ·
 ·       
    ·         
·  
 ·    ·         
 
|  |  
        ·  ·    · ·             · ·       ·  ·
 
    
  
|  |  0 . 
In order to see that 
   
    0 , rewriting the numerator, using the second term in    , which yields 
the condition:            ·2· ·       ·   
           ·2·          ·   
  ·  1 2·
                        ·    1 2·                   
 
 ·    . This condition will 
always be fulfilled when     
 
 ·    . For          
 
 ·    , the conclusion follows 
immediately. For        , notice that  ·
 
      
   0  (follows from equation 8), and the 




   
     
         ·         ·    · ·       ·  
|  |   
         ·  ·    · ·          ·     · ·       ·  
 
|  | , 
which is  0    if 1 2· ·           0 , and  0  if        . 
  
Steady state effects of   
Again, applying Cramer’s rule to the equations system above (  has been substituted for  ): 
   
    
  ·  ·    · ·          
 ·    · ·       
 
|  |  0   
 
   
     
   ·  ·    · ·         ·  
 ·    · ·       
|  |    0  
 
Steady state effects of E 
Proceeding as before gives:   23
   
    
     ·
 
 ·  
|  | ·  1 2· ·              0 if 1 2· ·                 0 , and 
        0.  
   
    
     ·
 
 ·  
|  | ·  0  if     0 .  
Steady state effects of    
Finally, applying Cramer’s rule the equations system above (substituting   for   ), gives:  
   
     
     ·
 
 ·   
|  |  ·  1 2· ·               0 if 1 2· ·                 0 . 
   
     
     ·
 
 ·   
|  | ·    0 .  
 
Dynamic analysis 
The cases when     
 
 ·     
The terms   ,    of the Jacobian matrix J are obtained from     ,      
 ·    · ·        
   
 · ·     
    . 
Taking the derivative with respect to   gives: 
    
   ·    · ·        ·   
 · ·     
   
 
   
 · ·     
     . 
Similarly, taking the derivative of     ,     with respect to B yields: 
    
   · ·    ·    · ·        ·   
 · ·     
   
 
   
 · ·     
     . 
For a steady state we have: 
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     . 
 
Together with    and    we are able to formulate:   24
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| |  0  is a necessary and sufficient condition for a saddle point and, hence, the result follows.  
 
The cases when     
 
 ·     
In this case the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is zero, and the trace is strictly negative, i.e., 
one eigenvalue is zero and the other is strictly negative. This implies a sink.  
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Figure 1. Illustration of the relationship between behaviour, B, and the amount of health 
investment,  I. The parabola is the graph of the function           ·          . The 
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Figure 2. Illustration of the shadow price of health capital (the horizontal straight lines) and the 
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Figure 3. Illustration of the shapes of the steady-state loci and possible equilibria. The parabola 
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Table 1. Comparative static results regarding steady-state levels of health and behaviour. We assume that the effect 
of knowledge, E, on the one-unit cost,  , is negative. If the effect had been positive the results in the third raw 
would be reversed.  
  Type 1:  
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Figure 4. Illustration of time paths of health capital and health-related behaviour. Any integral 
curve that passes across a steady-state locus must indicate a zero rate of change in the locus 
variable. The quadrant is divided into 4 different section at each side of the vertical line. Each 
saddle-point equilibrium has one stable branch. The sink-equilibrium is locally stable.    
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